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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
SUCCESSIONS
In Dileo v. Dileo' the court declared a sheriff's sale under
executory proceedings absolutely void. The opinion stated as
"firmly established jurisprudence that forced heirs do not lose
by prescription their right of inheritance in failing to accept the
succession within thirty years because, if they have not renounced
it, they are presumed to have accepted it. Le mort saisit le vif."2
The forced heirs of the deceased mother were declared owners in
indivision of the property in dispute, because plaintiffs had
proved no possession, as required under Act 6 of 19283 for vali-
dating after five years any sheriff's sale.
At the death of a donee, it was discovered that a piece of
property had been a gift inter vivos from her mother, whose
succession had been closed for more than twenty years. The
demand for collation of this property was refused in Byrne v.
Succession of Byrne.4 Since the property had been that of the
donee and not that of her mother at the time of the death of the
latter, Article 1029,5 penalizing an heir who embezzles or conceals
property of the succession, was not applicable. Prescription of
the right to demand collation was not discussed as such and con-
tinues to remain in doubt.
Sun Oil Company v. Smith6 applies the well-known principle
supported by the jurisprudence 7 that an attempted partition
where one of the co-owners is not represented is null as to all
parties. A thorough and careful survey of the evidence led to
the further observation on the ever-troublesome question of
estoppel:
"There is no merit in this plea of estoppel, as it is now
the well settled jurisprudence of this state that only admis-
sions or allegations made in the same judicial proceedings
effect a judicial estoppel; that admissions made in a judicial
proceeding other than the one in which the plea of estoppel
is urged operate as an estoppel against the one making the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 103, 46 So. 2d 53 (1950).
2. 46 So. 2d 53, 56.
3. La. R.S. (1950) 9:5642.
4. 215 La. 1050, 42 So. 2d 699 (1949).
5. La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. 216 La. 27, 43 So. 2d 148 (1949).
7. See the many cases cited in 216 La. 27, 39, 43 So. 2d 148, 152.
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admissions only when the one urging the plea has relied
upon them and has been deceived, misled, or damaged by
such reliance, and that such admissions are evidence but do
not of themselves create an estoppel." s
The fact that the successions of certain deceased co-owners
had not been administered did not prevent other co-owners from
exerting the right of partition, according to the decision in
Dobrowolski v. DobrowolskiY
DONATIONS
Board of Trustees of Columbia Road Methodist Episcopal
Church of Bogalusa v. Richardson° was concerned with inter-
pretation of an act of conditional donation by the defendant. It
appeared that plaintiffs were attempting to violate the condition
that the property be used for church purposes by advertising it
for sale as a commercial site. The court held that the condition
was clear and that the property could not be sold or used for
any other purpose than that specified by the donor. Since the
property was still being used correctly, however, no reversion
had taken place and the donation was not subject to revocation
by the donor.
The problem in McCarty v. Trichel" was factual, raising the
question of mental capacity of a testatrix. A preponderance of
evidence was not adduced to overcome the presumption of sanity.
The court pointed out that it was rare and only "where the evi-
dence of insanity was positive and overwhelming"'12 that "wills
were annulled and voided." 13 A brain tumor does not of itself
indicate insanity any more than would "a disease of the liver."' 4
In De la Vergne v. St. Paul5 a trust was terminated by the
court in accordance with the specific language of Act 81 of 1938,16
under which the trust had been created. The pertinent facts
having been admitted by all parties at interest, Section 9117 of
the trust estates act was applied. The section appears as follows:
"If owing to circumstances not known to the settler and not
8. 216 La. 27, 55, 43 So. 2d 148, 157.
9. 215 La. 1078, 42 So. 2d 760 (1949). See Dobrowolski v. Dobrowolski, 216
La. 327, 43 So. 2d 676 (1949).
10. 216 La. 633, 44 So. 2d 321 (1949).
11. 217 La. 444, 46 So. 2d 621 (1950).
12. 46 So. 2d 621, 624.
13. Ibid.
14. 46 So. 2d 621, 624.
15. 216 La. 92, 43 So. 2d 229 (1949).
16. La. R.S. (1950) 9:1791-2212.
17. La. R.S. (1950) 9:2175.
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anticipated by him, the continuance of the trust would defeat
or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes
of the trust, the proper court shall direct or permit the ter-
mination of the trust, in whole or in part.'8
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
In Saunier v. Saunier,9 the question arose as to proper dis-
position of refunds on taxes paid to the United States govern-
ment during the existence of the community. A contract between
husband and wife was made a part of the separation judgment
and provided that the wife would get certain real estate in addi-
tion to a cash settlement and that the remainder of the com-
munity property would belong to the husband. The court held
that the refund was the property of the husband and that the
sum of money which she received might be pleaded in compensa-
tion for judgment to pay alimony to her for their children.
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
A spare handful of torts cases reached the supreme court
during the past term, and of these, only one was of outstanding
importance.' By and large, the cases merely afford new illustra-
tions of familiar rules and tendencies.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Moore v. Blanchard2 was a case in which a bouncer employed
by defendant, who was keeper of a night club, assaulted and
seriously injured the plaintiff, a customer. The controversy was
decided by a jury, which awarded more than $4,000 in damages.
On appeal to the court of appeal 3 the damages were reduced to
$1,000 for a rather startling reason. The court observed that
night clubs are rowdy places by nature and the task of maintain-
ing order is a difficult one. Therefore, if employees hired to
maintain peace and protect customers "unconsciously exceed the
authority which they have under the law" their employer, who
is subject only to vicarious liability, is entitled to the compassion
of the court and should not be required to pay the full extent of
the actual damage inflicted.
18. Ibid.
19. 47 So. 2d 19 (La. 1950).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Brantley v. Clarkson, 217 La. 425, 46 So. 2d 614 (1950). See p. 191, infra.
2. 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949).
3. 35 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1948).
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